RESULTS
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a reliable solution to communication problems that require long-term data security. For its widespread use, however, the rate and reach of QKD systems must be improved. Twin-field (TF) QKD is a step forward toward this direction, with early demonstrations suggesting it can beat the current rate-versus-distance records. A recently introduced variant of TF-QKD is particularly suited for experimental implementation, and has been shown to offer a higher key rate than other variants in the asymptotic regime where users exchange an infinite number of signals. Here, we extend the security of this protocol to the finite-key regime, showing that it can overcome the fundamental bounds on point-to-point QKD with around 10 10 transmitted signals. Within distance regimes of interest, our analysis offers higher key rates than those of alternative variants. Moreover, some of the techniques we develop are applicable to the finite-key analysis of other QKD protocols.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote parties, Alice and Bob, to generate a shared secret key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who may have unbounded computational power at her disposal [1, 2] . While, ideally, the two parties can be at any distance, in practice, due to the loss and noise in the channel, point-to-point QKD is limited to a certain maximum distance at which secret key bits can securely be exchanged. In fact, the longest distance achieved to date in a terrestrial QKD experiment is about 400 km [3, 4] . The main limitation is the exponential decrease of the transmittance, η, with the channel length in optical fibres. Even with a high repetition rate of 10 GHz, it would take an average of about two minutes to send a single photon over a distance of 600 km of standard optical fibres, and about 300 years to send it over 1000 km [5] . Indeed, fundamental bounds [6, 7] on the private capacity of repeaterless point-to-point QKD protocols show that their secret-key rate scales at best approximately linearly with η. A protocol that aims to overcome this linear scaling must then include at least one middle node. Interestingly, this is not a sufficient condition. A well-known counterexample is the so-called measurement-device independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [8] , which uses the middle node for an untrusted Bell-state measurement operation. There are, however, extensions of MDI-QKD that can improve its rate scaling from η to √ η by either using quantum memories [9, 10] or quantum non-demolition measurements [11] . Such setups can, in fact, be considered to be the simplest examples of quantum repeaters [5, 12] , which are the ultimate solution to trust-free long-distance quantum communications [13] . However, even these simple versions may need more time to efficiently be implemented in practice [14, 15] . Remarkably, the recently proposed twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) [16] can also overcome this linear scaling while using a relatively simple setup. TF-QKD is related to MDI-QKD, and it inherits its immunity to detector side-channels. However, it relies on single-photon, rather than two-photon, interference for its entanglement swapping operation. The secret-key rate of this protocol was first conjectured [16] and then proven [17, 18] to scale with √ η too, making this approach a strong candidate to beat the current QKD records [19] [20] [21] [22] with today's technology. The main experimental challenge is that single-photon interference needs very precise phase stability, which makes it more demanding than two-photon interference. Also, some of its current security proofs [17, 18] need Alice and Bob to randomly choose a global phase, and then post-select only those rounds in which their choices match, which causes a drop in the secret key rate. Since the original proposal, several variants of TF-QKD have been developed [23] [24] [25] [26] , sharing the single-photon interference idea and its consequent √ η scaling, but differing in their experimental setups and security proofs. Moreover, some of these variants have been shown to be robust against phase misalignment [24] [25] [26] , which simplifies their experimental implementation.
In this paper, we focus on the TF-QKD variant introduced in [24] , which has two key features: (i) it does not need phase post-selection, which results in a higher secret-key rate; and (ii) it is a convenient option for experimental implementation. Indeed, most of the current TF-QKD experiments use this variant [19, 20, 22] . One of its defining characteristics is its unconventional security proof; specifically, its estimation of the phase-error rate of the protocol, a parameter needed to bound the amount of key information that may have leaked to an eavesdropper. In many QKD protocols, the phase-error rate of the single-photon emissions in one basis can be directly estimated by bounding the bit-error rate of the single-photon emissions in the other basis. In the above TF-QKD variant, however, the encoding arXiv:1910.11407v1 [quant-ph] 24 Oct 2019 bases are not mutually unbiased. To estimate the phase error rate, the authors in [24] use the complementarity [27] between the "phase" and the "photon-number" of a bosonic mode. In this case, the security of a bit encoded in the relative phase of two coherent pulses can be related to the detection statistics of photon-number states. More specifically, in the asymptotic regime, the phase-error rate can be bounded by a non-linear function of infinitely many yield probabilities for even photon-number states [24] , which can be estimated via the decoy-state method [28] [29] [30] .
While, in the asymptotic regime, the protocol in [24] offers a higher key rate than its counterparts, it is not obvious if this advantage will still hold in a practical setting where only a finite number of pulses is sent. In the finite-key regime, one should account for possible statistical fluctuations between the true phase-error rate and the measurement data used to estimate it. There are, however, two challenges in doing so. The first challenge is that the phase-error rate of the protocol is related to the measurement statistics of infinitely many combinations of photon-number states; in practice, one can only obtain bounds for a finite number of them, and dealing with the unbounded components is not as straightforward as in the asymptotic regime. The second challenge is that, unlike in many other QKD protocols, the encoding bases are not mutually unbiased. This opens the possibility that, under a coherent attack by Eve, the detection statistics of a particular round may depend on the basis choices made in previous rounds. Accounting for these correlations makes the analysis quite cumbersome.
In this work, we provide a rigorous security proof for the protocol in [24] that accounts for these two issues in the finite-key setting. Our security proof provides a tight bound on the key rate against general coherent attacks. To overcome the two main challenges mentioned above, we borrow ideas from the finite-key analysis of MDI-QKD [31] and the loss-tolerant protocol [32, 33] . In addition, we introduce new methods to deal with the particularities of the protocol. In particular, we develop a novel technique to bound the deviation between the sum of correlated Bernoulli random variables and its expected value, which can be much tighter than the widely employed Azuma's inequality when the success probability is low. We remark that this procedure could be employed to obtain tighter bounds in QKD security analyses in which Azuma's inequality is typically used, such as those considering intensity fluctuations [34] or other source imperfections [33, [35] [36] [37] . Importantly, our numerical simulations show that the protocol can overcome the repeaterless bounds [6, 7] for a block size of only 10 10 transmitted signals in nominal working conditions.
During the preparation of this manuscript, an alternative finite-key security analysis for an identical protocol setup has been reported in [38] , using an interesting, but different, approach. We would like to highlight that, under identical channel conditions, our analysis results in a higher secret-key rate and imposes fewer conditions on the setup parameters than that of Ref. [38] . In the Discussion section, we compare both approaches. We also compare our results with those of the sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD protocol introduced in [26] , whose security has recently been extended to the finite-key regime [39] . We find that for reasonably large block sizes, the asymptotic key rate advantage of the scheme in [24] is maintained in the finite-key regime, for most practical ranges of distance. Figure 1 . Setup for the TF-QKD protocol [24] described in Box 1. Alice and Bob generate their raw key from the rounds in which they both select the X basis and Charlie declares that a single detector has clicked. The key bit is encoded in the phase of their coherent state. When the users select the same (a different) bit, the constructive (destructive) at Charlie's 50:50 beamsplitter interference should cause a click in detector Dc (D d ). The Z-basis PRCSs are only used to estimate the phase-error rate of the X-basis emissions.
(1.2) If she (he) chooses the Z basis, she (he) sends an optical pulse in a PRCS of intensity µ, selected from the set µ = {µ0, µ1, . . . , µ d−1 } with probability pµ, where d is the number of decoy intensities used.
They repeat step (1) for N rounds.
(2) Detection An honest Charlie measures each round separately by interfering Alice and Bob's signals at a 50:50 beamsplitter, followed by threshold detectors Dc and D d on its output ports, and reports the pair (kc, k d ), where kc = 1 (k d = 1) if detector Dc (D d ) clicks and kc = 0 (k d = 0) otherwise. If he is dishonest, Charlie can measure all rounds coherently using an arbitrary quantum measurement, and report N pairs (kc, k d ) depending on the result. A round is considered successful (unsuccessful) if kc = k d (kc = k d ).
(3) Sifting For all successful rounds, Alice and Bob disclose their basis choices, keeping only those in which they have used the same basis. Let MX (MZ ) be the set of successful rounds in which both users employed the X (Z) basis, and let MX = |MX | (MZ = |MZ |) be the size of this set. Alice and Bob disclose their intensity choices for the rounds in MZ and learn the number of rounds M µν in MZ in which they selected intensities µ ∈ µ and ν ∈ µ, respectively. Also, they generate their sifted keys from the values of bA and bB corresponding to the rounds in MX . For those rounds in which kc = 0 and k d = 1, Bob flips his sifted key bit.
(4) Parameter estimation Alice and Bob apply the decoy-state method to M µν , for µ, ν ∈ µ, obtaining upper-bounds M U nm on the number of rounds Mnm in MZ in which they sent n and m photons, respectively. They do this for all non-negative n, m ≥ 0 such that n + m is even and n + m ≤ Scut for a prefixed parameter Scut. Then, they use this data to obtain an upper bound N U ph on the number of phase errors, N ph , in their sifted keys, and check if the upper bound e U ph = N U ph /MX is lower than a predetermined threshold value. If so, they continue to the last step; otherwise they abort the protocol. 
Parameter estimation and Secret-key rate analysis
The main contribution of this work-see Methods for the details-is a procedure to obtain a tight upper-bound N U ph on the total number of phase errors N ph in the finite-key regime for the protocol described in Box 1. Namely, we find that except for an arbitrarily small failure probability ε, it holds that
where p nm|X (p nm|Z ) is the probability that Alice and Bob's joint X (Z) basis pulses contain n and m photons, respectively, given by
with p n|µ = µ n exp(−µ)/n! being the Poisson probability that a PRCS pulse of intensity µ will contain n photons; ∆ and ∆ nm are statistical fluctuation terms defined in step 4 of Box 2; N 0 (N 1 ) is the set of non-negative even (odd) integers; and the rest of the parameters have been introduced in Box 1. The phase-error rate is then simply upperbounded by e U ph := N U ph /M X . Box 2 provides a step-by-step instruction list to apply our results to the measurement data obtained in an experimental setup.
When it comes to finite-key analysis, there is one key difference between the protocol in Box 1 and several other protocols, such as, for example, decoy-state BB84 [42] , decoy-state MDI-QKD [31] , and sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD [39] . In all the latter setups, when there are no state-preparation flaws, the single-photon components of the two encoding bases are mutually unbiased; in other words, they look identical to Eve once averaged by the bit selection probabilities. This implies that such states could have been generated from a maximally entangled bipartite state, where one of its components is measured in one of the two orthogonal bases, and the other half represents an encoded key bit. In fact, the user(s) could even wait until they learn which rounds have been successfully detected to decide their measurement basis, effectively delaying their choice of encoding basis. This possibility allows the application of a random sampling argument: since the choice of the encoding basis is independent of Eve's attack, the bit error rate of the successful X-basis emissions provides a random sample of the phase-error rate of the successful Z-basis emissions, and vice-versa. Then, one can apply tight statistical results such as the Serfling inequality [43] to bound the phase-error rate in one basis using the measured bit-error rate in the other basis. This approach, however, is not directly applicable to the protocol in Box 1, in which the secret key is extracted from all successfully detected X-basis signals, not just from their single-photon components. Moreover, the encoding bases are not mutually unbiased: the Z-basis states are diagonal in the Fock basis, while the X-basis states are not. This will require a different, perhaps more cumbersome, analysis as we highlight below.
To estimate the X-basis phase-error rate from the Z-basis measurement data, we construct a virtual protocol (see Box 3) in which the users learn their basis choice by measuring a quantum coin after Charlie/Eve reveals which rounds were successful. Note that, because of the biased basis feature of the protocol, the statistics of the quantum coins associated to the successful rounds could depend on Eve's attack. This means that the users cannot delay their choice of basis, which prevents us from applying the random sampling argument. Still, it turns out that the quantum coin technique now allows us to upper-bound the average number of successful rounds in which the users had selected the X basis and undergone a phase error. This bound is a non-linear function of the average number of successful rounds in which they had selected the Z basis and respectively sent n and m photons, with n + m even. More details can be found in the Methods Section; see Eq. (20) .
The main tool we use to relate each of the above average terms to their actual occurrences, N ph and M nm , is a refined version of Azuma's inequality [44, 45] . Azuma's inequality [46] is widely used in security analyses of QKD to bound sums of observables over a set of rounds of the protocol (in our case, the set of successful rounds after sifting), when the independence between the observables corresponding to different rounds cannot be guaranteed. For both Azuma's inequality and its refined version, the deviation term ∆ scales with the square root of the number of terms in the sum. In our case, ∆ scales with √ M s , where M s is the number of successful rounds after sifting. For parameters of comparable magnitude to M s , this provides us with a reasonably tight bound. Whenever the parameter of interest is small, however, the provided bound could instead be loose. This is the case for the crucial term M U 00 in Eq. (1), as vacuum states are unlikely to result in successful detection events, thus the bound obtained with Azuma's inequality can be loose. This is important because, in Eq. (1), the coefficient associated to the vacuum term is typically the largest. It is then essential to find a tighter bound for this term.
One key contribution of this work is a novel technique to bound the deviation between the sum of dependent Bernoulli random variables and its expected value. The technique is based on an iterative application of a concentration bound for supermartingales [47] (see Supplementary Note A), and it provides a much tighter bound than Azuma's inequality when either the value of the sum or its expected value is much lower than the number of terms in the sum. In particular, it provides a tight upper-bound for the vacuum component M 00 . In each iteration, the deviation term scales with the square root of the sum of M 00 and the deviation term corresponding to the previous iteration (except for an additive overhead), which effectively enables us to achieve a deviation term which scales with √ M 00 , see Eq. (6) . This scaling behaviour is comparable with that of the Chernoff bound for sums of independent random variables [48] . That is, with this technique, we can mitigate the effects of correlations between different rounds of the protocol on the tightness of our analysis. This technique may replace Azuma's inequality in other scenarios in which such correlations exist. Examples include the case of imperfect sources [33] , sources that suffer from information leakage [35] [36] [37] , or, in general, any scenario in which a lack of bias between the encoding bases cannot be guaranteed. We remark that every iteration has an associated failure probability, which adds to the total failure probability of the estimation process. There is then an optimal number of iterations, after which the decrease in the deviation term does not justify the increase in the failure rate. In our case, we find that four iterations are sufficient for our numerical purposes; see Box 2 and Supplementary Note A for further details.
Having obtained e U ph , we show in Supplementary Note B that the secret-key length, , can be lower bounded by
while guaranteeing that the protocol is c -correct and s -secret, with s = 2ε
is the Shannon binary entropy function, λ EC is number of bits that are spent in the error-correction procedure, PA is the failure probability of the privacy amplification scheme, and ε is the failure probability associated to the estimation of the phase error rate. Here, our security analysis follows the universal composable security framework [49, 50] , according to which a protocol is sec -secure if it is both c -correct and s -secret, with sec ≥ c + s . The correctness criterion is met when Alice and Bob's secret keys S A and S B are identical, and the protocol is ccorrect when Pr[S A = S B ] ≤ c . The secrecy criterion is met when the classical-quantum state ρ AE describing Alice's secret key and Eve's side information is of the form ρ AE = U A ⊗ ρ E , where U A is the uniform distribution over all bit strings, and ρ E is an arbitrary quantum state. The protocol is s -secret if
where · is the trace norm. 2. Set the security parameters c and PA, as well as the failure probabilities εc and εa for the inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound and the refined Azuma's inequality, respectively. Calculate the overall failure probability ε of the parameter estimation process, which depends on the number of times that the previous two inequalities are applied. In general, ε = d 2 εc + S cut 2 + 1 2 εa + 4εa, where d is the number of decoy intensities employed by each user, and the last term of 4εa comes from the number of iterations used in step 4. For Scut = 4 and three decoy intensities, we have that ε = 9εc + 13εa.
3. Use the analytical decoy-state method included in the Supplementary Note C to obtain upper bounds M U nm from M µν . Alternatively, use the numerical estimation method introduced in the Supplementary Notes of [31] .
Ms ln ε −1 a and ∆nm = ∆ for all n, m except for m = n = 0. Set ∆ (1) = ∆ and define the recursive function
Set ∆00 = ∆ (4) .
Use Eq.
(1) to find N U ph and set e U ph = N U ph /MX . 6. Use Eq. (4) to specify the required amount of privacy amplification and to find the corresponding length of the secret key that can be extracted. The key obtained is sec-secure, with sec ≥ c + s and s = 2ε + PA.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we analyse the behaviour of the secret-key rate as a function of the total loss. We simulate the nominal no-Eve scenario with an honest Charlie. In this case, the total Alice-Bob loss includes the loss in the quantum channels as well as that of Charlie's detectors. We compare the key rate for the protocol in Box 1, using the finitekey security analysis introduced in the previous section, with that of the sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD protocol [26, 39] , as well as with the finite-key analysis presented in Ref. [38] . In all cases, we use the simple channel model described in Supplementary Note D, which accounts for phase and polarisation misalignments. Also, we assume that both users employ three decoy-state intensities µ 0 > µ 1 > µ 2 . Since the optimal value µ 2 = 0 is typically difficult to achieve in practice, we set µ 2 = 10 −4 and optimise the secret-key rate over the value of µ 0 and µ 1 . We also optimise it over the selection probabilities, as well as over p X and α. Table I . List of parameters used in the numerical simulations. Here, p d is the dark count probability, per pulse, of the detectors, δ ph is the phase misalignment of the system, δ pol is the polarisation misalignment of the system, and f is the error-correction inefficiency. In our numerical simulations, we set ε = PA = s/3.
The nominal values for system parameters are summarised in Table I . We assume a phase mismatch of 9.1% between Alice and Bob's signals, corresponding to a QBER of around 2% for most attenuations, matching the experimental results in [19] . For brevity, we do not consider the effect of polarisation misalignment in our numerical results, but one can use the provided analytical model to study different scenarios of interest. In principle, even if the mechanism used for polarisation stability is not perfect, one can use polarisation filters to ensure that the same polarisation modes are being coupled at the 50:50 beamsplitter, at the cost of introducing additional loss. We assume an error correction leakage of λ EC = f M X h(e X ), where e X is the bit error rate of the sifted key, and f is the error correction inefficiency. For the security bounds, we set c = s = 10 −10 , and for simplicity we set ε = PA = s /3. Secret key rate per pulse for the protocol in Box 1 for different values of the block size, N , which represents the total number of rounds in the protocol. The overall Alice-Bob loss, 1/η, includes the loss in the quantum channels and Charlie's detectors. The repeaterless bound is given by − log 2 (1 − η) [7] . The simulation parameters are listed in Table I. In Fig. 2 , we display the secret key rate per pulse for the protocol in Box 1 for different values of the block size, N , of transmitted signals. It can be seen that the protocol can outperform the repeaterless bound for a block size of just Table I. 10 10 transmitted signals per user, at an approximate total loss of 50 dB. For standard optical fibres, this corresponds to a total distance of 250 km, if we neglect the loss in the photodetectors. At a 1 GHz clock rate, it takes only ten seconds to collect the required data. For a block size of 10 11 transmitted signals, the protocol can already outperform the repeaterless bound for a total loss ranging from 45 dB to over 80 dB. By increasing N , we approach the asymptotic performance of the protocol.
The dependence of the secret key rate on the block size N has been shown in Fig. 3 , at a fixed total loss of 50 dB and for several values of phase misalignment. In all cases, there is a minimum required block size to obtain a positive key rate. This minimum block size can be even lower than 10 9 in the ideal case of no phase misalignment, and it goes up to around 10 10 at δ ph = 20%. There is a sharp increase in the secret key rate once one goes over this minimum required block size after which one slowly approaches the key rate in the asymptotic limit. The latter behaviour is likely due to the use of Azuma's inequality. One can, nevertheless, overcome the repeaterless bound at a reasonable block size in a practical regime where δ ph ≤ 15%. At higher values of total loss this crossover happens at even larger values of δ ph .
In Fig. 4 , we compare the performance of the protocol in Box 1 with that of the sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD protocol presented in [26, 39] . In the asymptotic regime, the former protocol outperforms the latter at all values of total loss. For a block size of 10 12 transmitted signals, this is still the case up to 80 dB of total loss, after which the key rate is perhaps too low to be of practical relevance. For a block size of 10 10 transmitted signals, however, the curves for the two protocols cross at around 55 dB, where they happen to cross the repeaterless bound as well. In this case, the sending-or-not-sending protocol offers a better performance after this point. This behaviour is due to the different statistical fluctuation analyses applied to the two protocols. As explained in the Result section, the single-photon components in the sending-or-not-sending protocol are mutually unbiased, allowing for a simpler and tighter estimation of the phase-error rate. This is not the case for the TF-QKD protocol in Box 1, for which this estimation involves the application of somewhat looser bounds for several terms in Eq. (1). We conclude that for sufficiently large block sizes, the protocol in Box 1 maintains its better performance over the sending-or-not sending variant.
Finally, in Fig. 5 , we compare our results with those of the alternative analysis in [38] . To compute the secret-key rate of the latter, we use the code provided by the authors, except for the adjustments needed to match it to the channel model described in Supplementary Note D. It can be seen that, at all cases considered and for most practical regimes of interest, the analysis introduced in this paper provides a higher key rate than that of [38] . Moreover, we remark that the security proof presented in [38] , in its current form, is only applicable when the state generated by the weakest decoy intensity µ 2 is a perfect vacuum state of intensity µ 2 = 0. The security analysis presented in this Table I. work, however, can be applied to any experimental value of µ 2 , and we assume a value of µ 2 = 10 −4 , which may be easier to achieve in practice. That said, the security proof in [38] adopts an interesting approach that results in a somehow simpler statistical analysis. In particular, unlike in the analysis presented in this paper, the authors in [38] do not estimate the detection statistics of photon-number states as an intermediate step to bounding the phase-error rate. Instead, they show that the operator corresponding to a phase-error can be bounded by a linear combination of the Z-basis decoy states. While this linear bound is asymptotically looser than the non-linear formula in Eq. (1), it allows the application of a simpler statistical analysis based on a double use of Bernoulli sampling. Given that the finite-key analysis of a protocol could be part of the software package of a product, we believe that the additional key rate achievable by our analysis justifies its slightly more complex approach.
In conclusion, we have proven the security of the protocol in Box 1 in the finite-key regime scenario against coherent attacks. Our results show that, under nominal working conditions experimentally achievable by today's technology, this scheme could outperform the repeaterless secret-key rate bound in a key exchange run of only ten seconds, assuming a 1 GHz clock rate. It would also outperform other TF-QKD variants, as well as alternative security proofs in practical regimes of interest. Some of the techniques developed in this work could be used to improve the achievable secret-key rate in other scenarios in which Azuma's inequality is typically used. Secret key rate (bits per pulse) This work, N = 10 10 Analysis in [38] , N = 10 10
This work, N = 10 12 Analysis in [38] , N = 10 12 This work, N → ∞ Analysis in [38] , N → ∞ Repeaterless bound [7] Figure 5. Comparison between this work and the alternative analysis in [38] , for different block size values N of transmitted signals. The simulation parameters are listed in Table I .
METHODS
In this section, we introduce the procedure that we use to bound the phase-error rate of the protocol in Box 1, referring to the Supplementary Notes when appropriate. For notation clarity, we assume the symmetric scenario in which Alice and Bob employ the same X-basis amplitude α and the same Z-basis intensities µ ∈ µ. However, the analysis can be applied as well to the asymmetric scenario [40, 41] by appropriately redefining the parameters p nm|X and p nm|Z .
Virtual protocol
To bound the phase-error rate, we construct a virtual protocol in which Alice and Bob measure an observable that is conjugate to that used to generate the key. By the complementarity argument [27] , the bit-error rate of this virtual protocol is identical to the phase-error rate of the actual protocol, provided that the two protocols are equivalent. The equivalence condition is satisfied if the two protocols send the same quantum and classical information, thus Eve cannot tell which of the two is being performed. More concretely, our virtual protocol replaces Alice's X-basis emissions by the preparation of the state
where A is an ancilla system at Alice's lab, a is the photonic system sent to Eve, and |± = 1 √ 2 (|0 ± |1 ); while Bob's X basis emissions are replaced by a similarly defined |ψ x Bb . After Eve's attack, Alice and Bob measure systems A and B in the Z basis {|0 , |1 }, which is conjugate to the X basis {|+ , |− } that they would use to generate the key. It is useful to write the state in Eq. (7) as
where |C 0 and |C 1 are the (unnormalised) cat states
Alice's Z-basis emissions are diagonal in the Fock basis, and the virtual protocol replaces them by their purification
where p n|Z = µ∈µ p µ p n|µ is the probability that Alice's Z basis pulse contains n photons, averaged over the selection of µ. Unlike in the actual protocol, in the virtual protocol Alice and Bob learn the photon number of their signals by measuring systems A and B after Eve's attack. Lastly, Alice's emission of |ψ x Aa with probability p X and |ψ z Aa with probability p Z is replaced by the generation of the state
where A c is a quantum coin ancilla at Alice's lab; while Bob's is replaced by an equally defined |ψ BcBb . Alice and Bob measure systems A c and B c after Eve's attack, delaying the reveal of their basis choice. The different steps of the virtual protocol are described in Box 3.
Box 3: Virtual protocol
(1) Preparation Alice and Bob prepare N copies of the state |φ = |ψ AcAa ⊗ |ψ BcBb and send all systems a and b to Eve over the quantum channel.
(2) Detection Eve performs an arbitrary general measurement on all the subsystems a and b of |φ ⊗N and publicly announces N bit pairs (kc, k d ). Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between her measurement outcome and her set of announcements. A round is considered successful (unsuccessful) if kc = k d (kc = k d ). Let M (M) represent the set of successful (unsuccessful) rounds.
(3) Virtual sifting For all rounds, Alice and Bob jointly measure the systems Ac and Bc, learning whether they used the same or different bases, but not the specific basis they used. Let Ms (M d ) denote the set of successful rounds in which they used the same (different) bases. (4) Ancilla measurement Two points from the virtual protocol in Box 3 require further explanation. The first is that, in the real protocol, Bob flips his key bit when Eve reports k c = 0 and k d = 1. This step is omitted from the virtual protocol, since the X-basis bit flip gate σ z has no effect on Bob's Z-basis measurement result. The second point concerns step 5, which may appear to serve no purpose, but it is needed to ensure that the classical information exchanged between Alice and Bob is equivalent to that of the real protocol. The term p µ|n is the probability that Alice's (Bob's) Z-basis n-photon pulse originated from intensity µ, and it is given by
Phase-error rate estimation
We now turn our attention to Alice and Bob's measurements in step (4.1) in Box 3. Let u ∈ {1, 2, ..., M s } index the rounds in M s , and let ξ u denote the measurement outcome of the u-th round. The possible outcomes are ξ u = X ij , corresponding to |00 AcBc |ij AB , where i, j ∈ {0, 1}; and ξ u = Z nm , corresponding to |11 AcBc |n, m AB , where n and m are any positive integers. Note that the outcomes |10 AcBc and |01 AcBc are not possible due to the previous virtual sifting step. A phase error occurs when ξ u ∈ {X 00 , X 11 }. In Supplementary Note E, we prove that the probability to obtain a phase error in the u-th round, conditioned on all previous measurement outcomes in the protocol, is upper-bounded by
where F u−1 is the σ-algebra generated by random variables ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 , N 0 (N 1 ) is the set of non-negative even (odd) numbers, and the probability terms p nm|X and p nm|Z have been defined in Eqs. (2) and (3). In Eq. (13), for notation clarity, we have omitted the dependence of all probability terms on the outcomes of the measurements performed in steps (2) and (3) Pr (ξ u = Z nm |F u−1 ) .
The sequence Y 
where M nm := M (Ms) nm . Here, ∆ nm is a statistical fluctuation term that depends on the specific method used. For (n, m) = (0, 0), we use the refined Azuma's inequality [44, 45] , for which ∆ nm = ∆ = 5 4 √ 2 M s ln ε −1 a , with ε a being its failure probability. However, for the vacuum term (n, m) = (0, 0), the number of counts M 00 is very small and the refined Azuma's inequality turns out to be a loose bound. Instead, we use the alternative recursive method introduced in Supplementary Note A to find ∆ 00 , which fails with probability 4ε a . Similarly, we define N (l) ph as the number of phase errors among the first l trials, and define
Pr (ξ u ∈ {X 00 , X 11 }|F u−1 ) .
except with probability ε a , where N ph := N (Ms) ph . Now we will transform Eq. (13) to apply Eqs. (15) and (17) . Let us denote the right-hand side of Eq. 
We are now ready to apply Eqs. (15) and (17) to substitute the sums of probabilities by N ph and M nm . However, note that Alice and Bob only estimate the value of M nm for terms of the form n + m ≤ S cut and it is only useful to substitute Eq. (15) for these terms. With this in mind, we obtain 
We still need to deal with the sum over the infinitely many remaining terms of the form n + m > S cut . For them, we apply the following upper bound 
where ξ u = Z denotes that Alice and Bob learn that they have used the Z basis in the uth round in M s ; and M Z is the number of events of the form ξ u = Z obtained by Alice and Bob. In the last step, we have applied Azuma's inequality, using an identical argument as that of Eqs. (14)- (17 
The only remaining step is to substitute the real but unknown measurement counts M nm by their upper-bounds M U nm , obtained via the decoy-state analysis. After doing so, we obtain Eq. (1). The failure probability ε associated to the estimation of N ph is upper-bounded by summing the failure probabilities of all concentration inequalities used. That includes the use of the inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound and the refined Azuma's inequality, which fail, respectively, with probability ε c and ε a . For the case of three decoy intensities and S cut = 4, we have ε = 9ε c + 13ε a . In our simulations, we set ε c = ε a for simplicity.
Decoy-state analysis
Since Alice and Bob's Z-basis emissions are a mixture of Fock states, the measurement counts M nm have a fixed value, which is nevertheless unknown to them. Instead, the users have access to the measurement counts M µν , the number of rounds in M Z in which they selected intensities µ and ν, respectively. To bound M nm , we use the decoy-state method [28] [29] [30] . This technique exploits the fact that Alice and Bob could have run an equivalent virtual scenario in which they directly send Fock states |n, m with probability p nm|Z . Then, after Eve's attack, they know the number M nm of successful events in which they respectively sent n and m photons, and they assign each of them to intensities µ and ν with probability
where p µν = p µ p ν . Each of these assignments can be regarded as an independent Bernoulli random variable, and the expected number of events M µν assigned to intensities µ and ν is
In the actual protocol, Alice and Bob know the realisations M µν of these random variables. By using the inverse multiplicative Chernoff bound [48, 52] 
This problem can be solved numerically using linear programming techniques, as described in the Supplementary Note 2 of [31] . While accurate, this method can be computationally demanding. For this reason, we have instead adapted the asymptotic analytical bounds of [40, 53] to the finite-key scenario and used them in our simulations. The results obtained using these analytical bounds are very close to those achieved by numerically solving Eq. (27) . This analytical method is described in Supplementary Note C.
Supplementary Note A: Concentration inequalities for sums of correlated random variables
In this Note, we introduce the results that allow us to link the sums of probabilities in Eqs. (15) and (17) with the corresponding measurement counts. The main tool we use is Azuma's inequality [46] . More concretely, we use a refined version [44, 45] of Azuma's inequality, described in Sec. 1 below, that reduces the deviation terms by 5/8 with respect to the original inequality. In the special case of n = m = 0, however, even this refined version may not provide us with tight bounds as, under nominal conditions, the chance of getting a click when both Alice and Bob send vacuum states can be very low. For this reason, we develop an alternative bound, which is tighter than Azuma's inequality when the measurement counts are small, and which we apply exclusively to the M 00 term. This generic technique is described in Sec. 2 of this note.
Refined Azuma's inequality
Instead of using the standard Azuma's inequality [46] , we use the refined version in [44, 45] . First, we review the statement of the inequality, and then explain how we use it in our case.
a. Statement
Let Y 0 , Y 1 , ..., Y n be a sequence of random variables, and let F l be its natural filtration, i.e., the σ-algebra generated by {Y 0 , Y 1 , ..., Y l }. The sequence is a martingale if and only if
From [44, 45] , for a martingale satisfying
we can apply the refined Azuma's inequality, according to which
where D (p||q) := p ln p q
is the Küllback-Leibler distance between the probability distributions Bernoulli(p) and Bernoulli(q). Using Pinkser's inequality [44] , one can show that
and combining it with Eq. (A4), we obtain
where each bound fails with a probability of at most ε a for
Let ξ 1 , ..., ξ n be a sequence of Bernoulli random variables, not necessarily independent; and let Λ l = l u=1 ξ u represent the number of events of the form ξ u = 1 observed in the first l trials. Let us define the sequence of random variables
and Y 0 = 0. Note that its natural filtration F l is generated by the set of events {ξ 1 , ..., ξ l }, since it contains the same information as the set {Y 0 , Y 1 , ..., Y l }. Thus, Eq. (A10) can be equivalently written as
This sequence is a martingale, because
Also, we have that
and
where the last inequality results from (x − 1/2) 2 ≥ 0, for any real x. Therefore, the sequence Y l given by Eq. (A10) satisfies the requirements of the refined Azuma's inequality with σ 2 = 1/4, and by Eq. (A8), n u=1
Pr (ξ u = 1|ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 ) − Λ n ≤ ∆, n u=1
or equivalently n u=1
Pr (ξ u = 1|ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 ) + ∆,
where each of the two bounds fails with probability at most ε a for
As already mentioned, this suggests that the deviation term ∆ is improved by a factor of 5/8 as compared to the original Azuma's inequality.
Alternative bound for small measurement counts
The correction term for the refined Azuma's inequality in Eq. (A18) scales with the square root of the total number of rounds n. For that reason, it does not provide a tight bound when the counts Λ n are small. In this case, the alternative procedure presented here can offer a tighter bound. The starting point is a concentration inequality that combines Eqs. (8)-(15) of [47] . Our novel contribution is a recursive application of this result for the special case of sums of Bernoulli random variables. a. Concentration bound for martingales [47] Let Y 0 , Y 1 , ..., Y n be a martingale 1 with respect to its natural filtration F u . Let Y be the quadratic characteristic of the martingale, defined as
Then, for any x ≥ 0 and v > 0, it holds that
For the martingale defined in Eq. (A11), we have that
where the equality comes from Eq. (A14). Therefore, its quadratic characteristic Y n can be bounded by
Pr (ξ u = 1|F u−1 ) .
From Eq. (A16), we know that Y n ≤ ∆ except with probability at most ε a . That is,
with ∆ = 5 4 √ 2 n ln ε −1 a . Combining Eqs. (A22) and (A23), we have
Now, we have that
where in the second inequality we have used Eq. (A24) and in the third we have used Eq. (A20), substituting v 2 = Λ n + ∆. Now, we solve the following equation with respect to x exp −
which has the positive solution
Therefore, we have that
except with probability at most 2ε a . As already mentioned, when Λ n n, this bound is much better than the refined Azuma's inequality, which scales with √ n, whereas ∆ (2) scales with n 1/4 . To conclude, note that we can repeat the same argument as in Eqs. (A21)-(A24) to show that
and likewise, show that
with
One can continue with applying this technique iteratively to find even tighter bounds. By every iteration, we reduce the reliance of the deviation term on n, and will converge to a limit that the effective deviation scales with √ Λ n , similar to what can be achieved by the Chernoff bounds for sums of independent random variables. Every iteration would, however, increase the failure probability by a . In our analysis, we use the bound ∆ 00 := ∆ (4) for the vacuum component, which fails with probability 4ε a . This is because ∆ (4) is already close to the asymptotic limit of infinitely many iterations.
where λ EC (log 2 2 c ) is the number of bits revealed in the error correction (verification) step of the protocol. We now make use of the following theorem, introduced in [55] , which we reproduce here for completeness.
Theorem [55] : Let ε > 0, ρ AEB be a tripartite quantum state, X = {M x } and Z = {N z } be two POVMs on A, and X (Z) be the result of the measurement of X (Z). Then,
To apply this theorem, we consider a slight modification to our virtual protocol in Box 3. In step (4.1), Alice and Bob now first measure all the basis ancillas A c and B c in M s , keeping only the M X successful rounds in which they used the X basis, which we denote as the set M X . Let ρ AEB be the quantum state that describes all systems A and B in M X , as well as Eve's side information E on them. Note that if Alice measures all her systems A in the X basis, she will obtain a raw key X that is identical to the one she would have obtained in the real protocol; while if she measures them in the Z basis, she will obtain a raw key Z that is identical to that of the virtual protocol.
Let 
where in the last step we have used the fact that x n |z n 2 = 1/2, independently of the value of x n and z n . From Eq. (B3), it follows that
Now, let us assume that Bob measures his systems B using POVM Z, obtaining a string Z that is identical to the one that he would obtain in the virtual protocol. Clearly, the result of a measurement of B cannot contain more information about Z than system B itself, and therefore
from which we finally obtain
In the Methods section, we show that the error rate between Z and Z is bounded by e U ph , except with a failure probability ε. Therefore [54] ,
and by combining Eqs. (B2), (B8) and (B9), we have that
By substituting Eq. (B10) and the secret key length given in Eq. (4) of the main text into Eq. (B1), we finally obtain that the protocol is s -secret if we choose s such that
and isolating M ij , we obtain
(C6)
Three-decoy bounds
Now, we obtain explicit lower bounds for the case in which S cut = 4 and each of Alice and Bob use three different intensity settings, satisfying µ 0 > µ 1 > µ 2 and ν 0 > ν 1 > ν 2 , respectively. For this, we take inspiration from the asymptotic analytical bounds derived in [40] . First, we define
which is a function of some intensities that satisfy a S > a I and b S > b I , with a S , a I ∈ {µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 } and b S , b I ∈ {ν 0 , ν 1 , ν 2 }. The coefficients κ µ A and κ ν B depend on the specific M ij that is to be estimated, but we have omitted this dependence from the notation for simplicity. Using the previous equation, we now define
where the coefficients w µν A and w µν B also depend on the particular M ij that we want to estimate. If we rewrite Ω ij as Ω ij = 2 k,l=0ĉ µ k ν lM µ k ν l , it is easy to prove that if the coefficients w µν A , w µν B , κ µ A and κ µ B are all positive, the coefficientsĉ µ k ν l are always positive (negative) when k + l is even (odd). Thus, one can find upper (Ω U ij ) and lower (Ω L ij ) bounds on Ω ij by properly replacing eachM µ k ν l by either its upper or lower bound, as explained in the introduction of this Note.
a. Upper bound on M00
By substituting κ µ A = κ µ B = µ and w µν A = w µν B = (µ 2 ν − ν 2 µ), we obtain a function Ω 00 that can be rewritten as
where the coefficients
can be shown to be non-negative for all n, m [40] . Then, an upper bound on M 00 is straightforwardly given by
where we have lower bounded the term
c nm M nm by zero since all the coefficients satisfy c nm ≥ 0.
b. Upper bound on M11
By substituting κ µ A = κ µ B = 1 and w µν A = w µν B = (µ 2 − ν 2 ), we obtain a function Ω 11 that can be rewritten as
Finally from Eqs. (C4) and (C14), an upper bound on M 11 is given by
where M L 0A and M L 0B are lower bounds on the quantities M 0A = ∞ m=0 M 0m and M 0B = ∞ n=0 M n0 , respectively, and we have lower bounded the term ∞ n,m=3 c nm M nm by zero. Since M 0A and M 0B depend only on a single emitter, we can estimate them using the same method as for the vacuum component in BB84. Using the results of [42] , we have that 
can be shown to be non-negative for all the pairs (n, m) [40] . Then, an upper bound on M 22 is straightforwardly given by 
, we obtain a function Ω 02 that can be rewritten as
can be shown to be non-negative for all pairs (n, m) [40] . Then, an upper bound on M 02 is straightforwardly given by = (ν 1 − ν 2 )ν 2 , we obtain a function Ω 02 that can be rewritten as
can be shown to be non-negative for all the pairs (n, m) [40] . Then, an upper bound on M 20 is straightforwardly given by By substituting κ µ A = κ µ B = 1, w µν A = (µ 2 − ν 2 ) and w µν B = (µ − ν), we obtain a function Ω 13 such that
can be shown to be positive for the pairs (n, m) ∈ S + , being S + = {(n, m)|n = 1, m ≥ 2} and negative for the pairs (n, m) ∈ S − , being S − = {(n, m)|n ≥ 3, m ≥ 2} [40] . Then, by following a similar procedure to that used to derive Eq. (C17), an upper bound on M 13 can be obtained as 
can be shown to be positive for the pairs (n, m) ∈ S + , with S + = {(n, m)|n ≥ 2, m = 1} and negative for the pairs (n, m) ∈ S − , with S − = {(n, m)|n ≥ 2, m ≥ 3} [40] . Then, by following a similar procedure to that used to derive Eq. (C17), an upper bound on M 31 can be obtained as
where c max = (µ1−µ2) e −µ 0 pµ 0 (ν 2 1 −ν 2
2 ) e −ν 0 pν 0 , and M L 0A and M L 0B are given by Eqs. (C18) and (C19), respectively.
Supplementary Note D: Channel model
For our simulations, we use the channel model of [24] , which we summarize here. We model the overall loss between Alice (Bob) and Charlie by a beamsplitter of transmittance √ η, which includes the channel transmissivity and the quantum efficiency of Charlie's detectors. We consider that the quantum channels connecting Alice and Bob with Charlie introduce both phase and polarisation misalignments. We model the phase mismatch between Alice and Bob's pulses by shifting Bob's signals by an angle φ = δ ph π. We model polarisation misalignment as a unitary operation that transforms Alice's (Bob's) polarisation input mode a † in (b † in ) into the orthogonal polarisation output modes a † out and a † out⊥ (b † out and b † out⊥ ) as follows: a † in → cos(θ A )a † out − sin(θ A )a † out⊥ (b † in → cos(θ B )b † out − sin(θ B )b † out⊥ ). The rotation angles are assumed to be θ A = −θ B = arcsin δ pol . With this channel model, it can be shown [24] that the probability that Charlie reports a detection, given that both users employ the X basis, is given by
where γ = √ ηα 2 , θ = θ A − θ B , and Ω(φ, θ) = cos φ cos θ. The probability that Alice and Bob end up with different key bits is given by
while the probability that Charlie reports a detection, given that both users employ the Z basis and select the intensities µ and ν, respectively, is
where I 0 (z) = 1 2πi e (z/2)(t+1/t) t −1 dt is the modified Bessel function of the first kind. In our simulations, we assume that the observed measurement counts equal their expected value, that is, we set M X = N p 2 X Q X and M µν = N p 2 Z p µ p ν Q µν , where M µν denotes the number of successful rounds in which Alice and Bob select the Z basis and the intensities µ and ν, respectively. Also, we assume that the bit-error rate of the sifted-key equals the probability given by Eq. (D2). previous measurement outcomes in the protocol. This includes Eve's measurement outcomes and Alice and Bob virtual sifting results, which we collectively denote as the event ξ; as well as Alice and Bob's measurement outcomes ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 of the previous u − 1 registers. That is, Tr[σ u ] = Pr(ξ, ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 ). The probability that Alice and Bob learn that they used the Z basis and sent Fock states |n, m in the u-th round of M s , conditioned on all the previous events, is Pr (ξ u = Z nm |ξ, ξ 1 , ..., ξ 
where in the second equality we have usedÔ sM ū =M ūÔ s andÔ s |00 AcBc = |00 AcBc . Now, letÊ u = ūM † ūM ū . SinceÊ u is a sum of positive semi-definite operators, it is positive semi-definite. Therefore, we can decompose it aŝ E u = Ê u Ê u , and rewrite Eq. (E5) as Pr (ξ u = Z nm |ξ, ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 ) = p 2 Z p nm|Z n| a m| b Ê u Ê u |n a |m b
Pr(ξ, ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 ) = p 2 Z p nm|Z Ê u |n a |m b 2 Pr(ξ, ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 ) .
(E6)
Using an identical approach, we can show that the probability that Alice and Bob will learn that they used the X basis and sent cat states |C i C j in the u-th successful round is Pr (ξ u = X ij |ξ, ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 ) = p 2 X Ê u |C i a |C j b 2 Pr(ξ, ξ 1 , ..., ξ u−1 )
.
Now, we want to relate the probability terms on the left hand side of Eqs. (E6) and (E7). For this, we use the approach of [24] and apply the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality to show that (E8)
